

NATO's Paradigm Shift: Searching for a Traditional Security-Human Security Nexus

By: Isaac Kfir*

***Abstract:** The paper explores what should NATO's agenda in the post-Afghanistan period, suggesting that to remain relevant the alliance has to develop a new identity that is human security in orientation. Reviewing the Military Concept against Terrorism (MDCAT), the Chicago & Wales Summits and the EU's Common Defense and Security Policy (CDSP) two propositions are offered. First, that the vacillating commitment of the members who either chose to address security issues through EU security mechanisms or form a coalition of the willing, threatens NATO's relevance. Second, that by developing MDCAT and Smart Defense along a more human security framework coupled with NATO's maritime operations, the Alliance would satisfy the needs of its European members allowing them to employ NATO as a way to support CDSP and in doing so ensure a continued reliance on NATO.*

* Isaac Kfir is a Visiting Assistant Professor of International Relations and Law at Syracuse University where he currently teaches International Human Rights Law, Post-Conflict Reconstruction and the Rule of Law, and International Security. He is a Research Associate at the Institute for National Security and Counterterrorism (INSCT), Syracuse University. Isaac received his Ph.D. in International Relations from the London School of Economics (1999) and holds a Post-Graduate Diploma in Law (PGDL) and Bar Vocational Certificate (BVC) from BPP Law School (2001). He was also a member of Inner Temple.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was formed on April 4, 1949, as a defensive alliance, design to deter Soviet expansionism and other external threats¹ through the threat to use or actual use of force.² Additionally, NATO also sought to promote neoliberal democratic ideals. In the post-Cold War period, as the *raison d'être* for NATO's existence disappeared, ethno-nationalist, genocidal conflicts broke out in the Balkans, posing a direct risk to the European members. These conflicts offered NATO the opportunity to adopt a new identity: a second-generation peacekeeping actor within the Euro-Atlantic zone³ and remain an important player in international relations. Thus, NATO managed key operations in the Balkans and helped administer peace, stabilization and reconstruction. Of late however NATO seems to be grappling with an identity crisis, one that has been intensified by the drawing down of international forces in Afghanistan, limited or no intervention in crises in Libya, Syria, and the Ukraine, raising the prospect of irrelevancy especially when one considers the U.S. strategic pivot,⁴ attempts by Europeans to reignite enthusiasm for integration through a common defense, security and foreign policy,⁵ and a growing demand for defense spending cuts, which already affects NATO.⁶

NATO's notion of collective security infuses two key meanings: an idealized, Kantian-Wilsonian inspired international order seeking and promoting neoliberal democratic values;⁷ and, a collective security alliance based on the League of Nations' experience that combines shared values with positive security obligations.⁸ In focusing on traditional security, NATO recognizes that war is always possible and that the use of force has

¹ The Preamble to the Washington Treaty notes that the shared values are democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law in addition to a desire to live in peace "with all peoples and governments." *The North Atlantic Treaty*, April 4, 1949. Additionally and more specifically, Article 5 declares, "The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area." *The North Atlantic Treaty*, April 4, 1949.

² In its 1950 Strategic Concept, the Alliance declared that its objectives are: coordinate in times of peace the military and economic strength of the members as a way to deter threats to peace and to ensure that it can respond to threats. 'The Strategic Concept for the Defense of the North Atlantic Area', (DC 6/1), dated January 6, 1950.

³ Even though technically Bosnia and Kosovo were out-of-area operations, because they were in territorial Europe, the NATO members could make the case that they were operating within their zone a claim that cannot be made in relation to NATO's role in Iraq and Afghanistan.

⁴ Hillary Clinton, 'America's Pacific Century', *Foreign Policy*, November 2011, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/10/11/americas_pacific_century; Nick Bisley and Andrew Phillips, 'Rebalance To Where?: US Strategic Geography in Asia', *Survival*, Vol. 55, No. 5 (2013), pp. 95-114.

⁵ Anand Menon correctly notes that the fundamental objective of the Lisbon Treaty was to make the European Union "a more effective global actor." Anand Menon, 'European Defence Policy from Lisbon to Libya', *Survival*, Vol. 53, No. 3, (2011), p. 75.

⁶ Sven Biscop, 'The UK and European Defense: Leading or Leaving', *International Affairs*, Vol. 88, No. 6 (2012), pp. 1297-1313; Ellen Hallams and Benjamin Scheer, 'Towards a 'Post-American' Alliance? NATO Burden-Sharing after Libya', *International Affairs*, Vol. 88, No. 2 (2012), pp. 313-27.

⁷ The preamble to the North Atlantic Treaty declares that NATO is founded on democratic principles, which requires members to be democratic. NATO has adopted a host of programs such as Partnership for Peace designed to promote democratic values.

⁸ David S. Yost, 'The New NATO and Collective Security', *Survival*, Vol. 40, No. 2 (1998), pp. 135-60.

wide-ranging effects, which is why NATO served as a deterrence actor, especially during the Cold War.⁹ At the same time, it also identified that by promoting and preserving individual rights, through interaction with state actors, it could prevent conflict and protect the NATO members.¹⁰

The events of 9/11 ushered in a new period for NATO, as the threat posed by al-Qaeda called for a multifaceted approach to security that oscillated between upholding a traditional security policy (protecting the territorial sovereignty of the member states) and addressing the causes that lead to the rise of nihilist, transnational terrorist groups. Accordingly, NATO's security identity concentrated on two multifaceted themes: a security program for the Euro-Atlantic zone that focused on anti-terrorism and internal security (security for the homelands that is technical in nature and orientation) and counter-terrorism, liberal peace-driven, nation-building program understood as liberal peacebuilding,¹¹ as a means to attain external security.¹²

In 2014, NATO as it places the Afghan experience behind it, faces new questions on whether the alliance needs a new agenda not to mention an identity so that it could remain relevant in international relations.¹³ The challenges stem in part from the evolution of threats from non-traditional security¹⁴ or unforeseeable crises such as natural disasters, large populations, disease coupled with the need to reduce public spending. It is important to emphasize that even though it remains largely unclear what is NATO's budget and the specific amount that each member provides the alliance, the assumption is that the cost of keeping NATO is large.¹⁵ Thus, one way for NATO to remain relevant at a time of economic austerity and a general, albeit unspecific,

⁹ David N. Schwartz, 'The Role of Deterrence in NATO Defense Strategy: Implications for Doctrine and Posture', *World Politics*, Vol. 28, No. 1 (1975), pp. 118-33; Stephen M. Walt, 'The Renaissance of Security Studies', *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 35, No. 2 (1991), pp. 211-39; Joseph S. Nye Jr., and Sean M. Lynn-Jones, 'International Security Studies: A Report of a Conference on the State of the Field', *International Security*, Vol. 12, No. 4, (1988), pp. 5-27; Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998); John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001).

¹⁰ Article 2 calls on the NATO members to promote their ideals – democracy, freedom and economic liberalism – asserting that such a campaign enhances international peace and security.

¹¹ Oliver Richmond identifies four strands with the liberal peace tradition: victor's peace in which the victor imposes a framework on the vanquished; an institutional peace which calls on states to develop a legal and normative framework that is multilateral in its nature; a constitutional peace, which evolves from a Kantian conception of peace that calls for democracy, trade and a set of cosmopolitan values; and, civil peace which underlines the importance of civilian advocacy and mobilization to defend basic human rights. Oliver P. Richmond, 'Emancipatory Forms of Human Security and Liberal Peacebuilding', *International Journal*, Vol. 62, No. 3 (2007), p. 462.

¹² Tobias Bunde and Timo Noetzel, 'Unavoidable Tensions: The Liberal Path to Global NATO', *Contemporary Security Policy*, Vol. 31, No. 2 (2010), pp. 295-318.

¹³ A core assumption on which this paper is based is that institutions matter. Gilles Andréani, 'Why Institutions Matter', *Survival*, Vol. 42, No. 2 (2000), pp. 81-95; Adam Przeworski, 'Institutions Matter?', *Government and Opposition*, Vol. 39, No. 4 (2004), pp. 527-40.

¹⁴ Katja Weber describes non-traditional security challenges as threats that do not impact territorial sovereignty but rather society, communities and individuals necessitating multilateral responses. Katja Weber, 'Recalibrating Sovereignty-Related Norms: Europe, Asia and Non-Traditional Security Challenges', *Journal of European Integration*, Vol. 35, No. 1 (2013), p. 19.

¹⁵ The Dutch Court of Audit, which is an independent organization that reviews government spending has called for a greater debate about NATO's spending and the fact that the whole system, including NATO's budget for military, civilian and investment projects was \$3.27 billion in 2013, without explaining how much its member contributes. Anthony Deutsch, 'Dutch auditor calls for more transparency on NATO spending', *Reuters*, Jun. 10, 2014. <http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/06/10/us-nato-budget-netherlands-idUSKBN0EL13T20140610>.

opposition to defense spending is by developing an identity tailored on addressing the link between weak, fragile states and Islamist extremism, particularly in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, which poses a direct and immediate threat to the NATO member states and international security.¹⁶

The paper opens by reviewing the concept of human security and its implication for NATO before shifting attention to the alliance's 2002 Military Concept for Defense against Terrorism (MCDAT), structured to combine NATO's traditional security focus – protecting member states from attacks on their sovereign territory – with human security¹⁷ (addressing civil, political, social and economic rights violations) that called for state-building. The second section offers an overview of the 2012 Chicago Summit and the 2014 Wales Summit, as the member states discussed the end of Afghan mission and the need to adapt to a new security environment that included the formulation of Smart Defense Doctrine¹⁸ and greater support for a cooperative agenda, in which NATO actively seeks to work with states and regional organizations. The third section analyzes the potential impact of the Common Security and Defense Policy on NATO, as 21 out of the 28 states that are members of NATO are EU countries. The premise of the section is that it is likely that the EU will continue to encroach on NATO's domain, as it seeks its own security identity.¹⁹ The final section reviews NATO's two large maritime, security operations: Operation *Active Endeavour* and Operation *Ocean Shield* which underline NATO's recognition that its ability to engage in mass land operations has greatly declined, leading it to search for another way to emphasize its usefulness, which is maritime security. Simply, it is argued that NATO is a multinational actor used to operating in high-pressure environments, making it well suited to operate in zones and areas that are culturally, geographically, and politically diverse.

*Human Security, Traditional Security & MCDAT*²⁰

The end of the Cold War meant that threats from traditional sources – states – were replaced by threats from non-traditional avenues such as drastic climate change, terrorist organizations, and unexpected population

¹⁶ There are numerous explanations for why individuals turn to terrorism, though the approach taken in the context of this paper is based on a human security analysis. To put it differently, states that “deny subsistence rights along with civil and political rights create an environment that is conducive to the development of terrorism.” Rhonda Callaway and Julie Harrelson-Stephens, ‘Toward a Theory of Terrorism: Human Security as a Determinant of Terrorism’, *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, Vol. 29, No. 7, (2006) p. 679.

¹⁷ Human insecurity refers to environments where individuals suffer or face gross human rights violations.

¹⁸ Smart defense, which can also be understood as ‘smart power’ has two key elements, first, that constrained defense budgets demand that nations engage in specialization as a way to reduce costs. This therefore calls for revised militaries, as not every nation for example needs a submarine capability. The second element refers to multilateralism as a way to spread the costs. James Stavridis, ‘Sailing on to the NATO Chicago Summit’, United States European Command, Apr. 30, 2012, <http://www.eucom.mil/media-library/blog%20post/23317/sailing-on-to-the-nato-chicago-summit>; Oliver Barnett, ‘Talking ‘Smart Power’ with Admiral Stavridis’, *The Washington Post*, Jul. 25, 2013, <http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/world-report/2013/07/25/recently-retired-nato-commander-james-stavridis-on-conflict-resolution>.

¹⁹ The European Union through the Common Foreign and Security Policy, which incorporates the European Security and Defense Policy, has led the EU to undertake over twenty operations that include Atalanta, the EU's first maritime ESDP designed to deter pirates off the Somali coast to EU's mission in the Congo.

²⁰ *NATO's Military Concept for Defense against Terrorism*, NATO, International Military Staff, updated January 04, 2011, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_69482.htm

movements. Such a change necessitated a new approach to security, which is what the notion of human security largely encapsulates. Sadoka Ogata, the former UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and Co-chair of the Commission on Human Security, and Johan Cels, a former Project Leader at the Commission on Human Security define human security as, “protecting people from severe and pervasive threats, both natural and societal, and empowering individuals and communities to develop the capabilities for making informed choices and acting on their own behalf.”²¹ In its most basic form, human security is a holistic, evolving, people-centric interpretation of security that exists when an individual has political and civil rights (“freedom from fear”) and social and economic rights (“freedom from want”).²² Human security therefore places a strong emphasis on people, their rights understood through the rubric of international human rights law and the rights of communities as opposed to the state prerogative. It is this commitment to human rights that explains why human security proponents reject the notion that a state can derogate from human rights.²³ Taken to its most extreme, human security could serve in defense of intervention, if the purpose is to prevent or stop gross human rights violations.

The Military Concept for Defense against Terrorism (MCDAT) emerged out of a request that NATO’s Military Authority prepare a military concept to address the threat of transnational terrorism, which the Heads of State and Government endorsed at the 2002 Prague Summit.²⁴ MDCAT was therefore a natural continuation of the Reykjavik meeting in which, the alliance announced that for combating terrorism, it would operate outside of the Euro-Atlantic zone.²⁵

²¹ Sadoka Ogata and Johan Cels, ‘Human Security: Protecting and Empowering People’, *Global Governance*, Vol. 9, No. 3 (2003), p. 274.

²² United Nations, *Human Development Report* (New York: United Nations Development Programme, 1994); See for example the colloquium in *Security Dialogue* that highlighted how diverse the human literature is mainly because of the imprecision that is associated with them term. *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 35, No. 3 (2004).

²³ Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 29: “States of Emergency,” UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev. 1/Add.11 (2011); United Nations Millennium Declaration, adopted 8 September 2000, G.A. Res. 55/2, UN GAOR, 55th Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/2 (2000). A good example of the tensions between the two approaches is seen in the discussion over the right to life (Article 6, ICCPR) and military necessity in respect to the killing a high profile target—targeted killing. Under international humanitarian law, which is preoccupied with states and their conduct in times of conflict, the state if it is to deprive a life of a person needs to show that the individual was a member of an armed force engaged in combat, though the person need not be in combat when they are killed. This means that what determines the status of the individual is their membership in an armed force, whereas under international human rights law the decision to kill a person requires the state to examine the whole context in which the killing occurs. Christian Tomuschat, ‘Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law’, *European Journal of International Law*, Vol. 21, No. 1 (2010), pp. 15-23.

²⁴ The 1999 Strategic Concept recognized terrorism as a threat. “Terrorism constitutes a serious threat to peace, security and stability that can threaten the territorial integrity of States. We reiterate our condemnation of terrorism and reaffirm our determination to combat it in accordance with our international commitments and national legislation.” Washington Summit Communiqué, *NATO Press Release*, April 24, 1999 (NAC-S(99(64), Para. 42. <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-064e.htm>. *Prague Summit Declaration, Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Prague on 21 November 2002*, NATO Press Release, November 21, 2002 (Press Release (2002)127. <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/p02-127e.htm>

²⁵ The Communiqué declared, “We reiterate our determination to combat the threat of terrorism for as long as necessary.” It further stated, “...we will continue to strengthen our national and collective capacities to protect our populations, territory and forces from any armed attack, including terrorist attack, directed from abroad.” *Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council Held in Reykjavik on 14 May 2002*, NATO Press Release M-NAC-1(2002)59, Para. 3.

Initially, MCDAT called for a “hard power” response to terrorism, manifested in the deployment of military forces to search, capture and kill members of al-Qaeda; a military intervention in Afghanistan to remove the Taliban and the condition that facilitated the country being a safe-haven for al-Qaeda; and, the shoring up of the homeland through an expansive defense system that includes crisis and disaster management and a new legal counter-terrorism regime. In other words, the response was tailored to meet the threat abroad, as the “Allied nations agree that terrorists should not be allowed to base, train, plan, stage and execute terrorist actions and that the threat may be severe enough to justify acting against these terrorists and those who harbor [sic.] them, as and where required, as decided by the North Atlantic Council.”²⁶ Thus, MCDAT rests on two pillars: threat assessment and military operations. Threat assessment was left deliberately vague, as threats evolve, especially when it comes to terrorism, necessitating a case-by-case approach. Simply, there is value in a loose definition, which permits flexibility, ensuring that one could engage in counter- and/or anti-terrorism measures, depending on the case.²⁷ Therefore, in developing its threat assessments, NATO considers not only what factors may lead to terrorist activity, but also what measures the alliance can and should take to resolve them, suggesting that NATO has enormous latitude, not only in defining the threats but in how to respond to them.²⁸

Under the rubric of military operations, MDCAT identified four key roles for NATO: anti-terrorism (defensive measures), consequence management (post attack recuperation), counter-terrorism (offensive measures), and military cooperation. The anti-terrorism program centers primarily on NATO’s developing defensive measures to protect troops, civilians, and critical infrastructure against terrorist attacks. NATO recognized that in the post-9/11 period terrorists have the understanding and knowledge to use modern technology to achieve devastating results. Responding to these threats requires proactive defensive and expansive offensive programs. NATO has undertaken a host of measures under the proactive defensive program from sharing intelligence, standardizing threat warning conditions and defensive procedures, providing air and maritime protection; and assisting nations wishing to withdraw citizens or forces by providing forces. In 2003, the Terrorist Threat Intelligence Unit (TTIU) composed of civilians and military intelligence personnel, became permanent and was tasked with assessing risks and challenges to NATO members from

²⁶ NATO’s *Military Concept for Defence against Terrorism*, NATO Issues, (October 2003). <http://www.nato.int/ims/docu/terrorism.htm>. The United States took the position that “The fight must be taken to the enemy, to keep them on the run.” George W. Bush, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, D.C.: White House, March 2006), p. 8, <http://nssarchive.us/NSSR/2006.pdf>.

²⁷ NATO’s military concept for defense against terrorism distinguishes between counter-terrorism, understood as offensive measures aims at reducing the vulnerability of forces, individuals and property to terrorism, and anti-terrorism which refers to defensive measures that reduce the vulnerability of forces, individuals and property to terrorism, to include limited response and containment by military forces and civil agencies. *NATO’s Military Concept for Defence against Terrorism*, NATO Issues, (October 2003). <http://www.nato.int/ims/docu/terrorism.htm>.

²⁸ In April 2010, for example, through NATO’s Science for Peace and Security Programme, experts from NATO, Partner and Mediterranean Dialogue countries met in Moscow to discuss environmental security and eco-terrorism, underlining NATO’s appreciation that the next wave of terrorist activities may not be religious in nature but rather ecological.

terrorists. Arguably, the purpose behind forming the unit was to aid in intelligence sharing,²⁹ something that is naturally difficult to achieve, as intelligence organizations are disinclined to share information.³⁰ Another important program adopted under the consequence management program, is the Defense against Terrorism Program of Work (DAT POW), launched by NATO's National Armaments Directors and approved by heads of state and government at the 2004 Istanbul Summit. DAT POW, which has three key functions: incident management; force protection and survivability; network engagement,³¹ strives to use advance technology to prevent or mitigate the effects of non-conventional terrorist attacks, such as suicide attacks.³² DAT POW underlines NATO's commitment to multilateralism and cost-sharing. DAT POW permits the NATO members, mainly the Europeans, to pursue defense measures to address threats while being economically prudent,³³ which is also what Smart Defense is all about.

NATO's clearest counter-terrorism action was its involvement in Afghanistan, which has attracted enormous practical and academic interest.³⁴ Prima facie, counter-terrorism activities would rest within the domain of traditional security as it necessitates military force to address the threats posed by terrorist. Thus, NATO's involvement in Afghanistan, an out-of-area operation stemmed from the fact that the United States needed NATO to fulfill the role that the U.S. was doing in response to the infrastructure and the security situation in Afghanistan, as Washington's focus was shifting to Iraq. That is, ISAF was to pursue a security-development program that meant helping Afghans rebuild their country.³⁵ Second, the North Atlantic Council

²⁹ The 2004 Istanbul Communiqué called for "improved intelligence sharing between our nations, including through our Terrorist Threat Intelligence Unit and a review of current intelligence structures at NATO Headquarters." *Istanbul Summit Communiqué, Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council*, June 24, 2004. Press Release (2004)096, updated November 28, 2007. <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2004/p04-096e.htm>

³⁰ Richard Aldrich uses the 2004 Madrid bombing to argue that had countries shared intelligence terrorists would find it harder to exploit gaps in intelligence to commit atrocities. Richard J. Aldrich, 'Transatlantic Intelligence and Security Cooperation', *International Affairs*, Vol. 80, No. 4 (2004), pp. 731-753.

³¹ *Defence against terrorism programme of work (DAT POW)*, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, http://www.nato.int/cps/ar/natolive/topics_50313.htm

³² In 2010, DAT POW was placed under NATO's Emerging Security Challenges Division.

³³ DAT POW allows an individual NATO country to assume the lead in developing advance technologies or counter-measures that meet the security needs of the members. Thus for example, under the Force Protection and Survivability umbrella, specifically in relation to chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons, which is of major concern to the NATO members, the Czech Republic is researching a prototype for chemical detention, while Canada annually organizes Exercise Precise Response, which is a training exercise exploring a scenario with a live CBRN agent.

³⁴ See for example, Ivo Daalder, and James Goldgeier, 'Global Nato', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 85, No. 5 (2006), pp. 105-13; Sean Kay and Sahar Khan, 'NATO and Counter-insurgency: Strategic Liability or Tactical Asset', *Contemporary Security Policy*, Vol. 28, No. 1 (2007), pp. 163-81; Jeremy Poulter, 'NATO as a Security Organization: Implications for the Future Role and Survival of the Alliance', *The RUSI Journal*, Vol. 151, No. 3 (2006), pp. 58-61; Mats Berdal and David Ucko, 'NATO at 60', *Survival*, Vol. 51, No. 2 (2009), pp. 55-76; Alexander Mattelaer, 'How Afghanistan has Strengthened NATO', *Survival*, Vol. 53, No. 6 (2011), pp. 127-40.

³⁵ Notably, U.S. forces were to remain focus on seeking out and destroying al-Qaeda, ensuring that between 2003 and 2014, two operations were running in Afghanistan, a counterinsurgency one designed to fight al-Qaeda and the Taliban; and a second, tailored on the neo-liberal state-building model, though increasingly being understood through a security-development paradigm. Thus, for example Security Council Resolution 1510 (2003) ISAF's mandate was expanded beyond Kabul and was authorized "to support the Afghan Transitional Authority and its successors in the maintenance of security in areas of Afghanistan outside of Kabul and its environs, so that the Afghan Authorities as well as the personnel of the United Nations and other international civilian personnel engaged, in particular, in reconstruction and humanitarian

adopted the stance that the security and stability of Afghanistan was linked to its own security.³⁶ Third, NATO wanted to address the root causes that made Afghanistan a safe-haven for Islamic, jihadi terrorism.³⁷

Thus, when NATO took charge of ISAF in August 2003, NATO, it assumed responsibility for maintaining a secure environment for free and fair elections and the development of the rule of law; aiding in reconstruction; and supporting the development and training of Afghan security forces including teaching them about human rights.³⁸ Over time however, it became apparent that a successful counterterrorism policy required addressing the political, civil, social, and economic conditions in weak, fragile and undemocratic societies, and therefore NATO, and other actors such as the EU, assumed a more of a state-builder, rights promoter role in the hope of addressing the root causes of radicalism and anti-westernism.³⁹

In sum, the mission in many ways underlined the need for a traditional security-human security doctrine for NATO, as NATO went into Afghanistan employing traditional security tools to what essentially was a human security mission: provide basic security for the people of Afghanistan. Ultimately, however what happened was that NATO's combat mission help undermine the stabilization mandate and the rebuilding process as by acting as a traditional security actor, NATO was eliciting negative reactions from the Afghans. Astri Suhrke captured this paradox by referring to an assault in the Sangin District, Helmand Province carried out by 5,500 ISAF soldiers, 1,000 U.S. paratrooper supported by 6000 Afghan soldiers. Suhrke writes, "Afterwards, one of the elders, Haji Mohammed Yaqub, said he believed the valley was now quiet enough for reconstruction to begin. But, he added, it was probably too late for the NATO force to be welcomed by most residents."⁴⁰

NATO post-2012: Seeking a New Security Agenda?

The Chicago Summit marks an important milestone in NATO's quest for an identity. The Summit, which took place soon after the Libyan intervention and as NATO was transitioning out of Afghanistan, highlighted how NATO was going to focus on security threats by adopting two separate initiatives – Smart Defense and the Connected Forces Initiative, a training and exercises program aimed at strengthening the NATO Response

efforts, can operate in a secure environment, and to provide security assistance for the performance of other tasks in support of the Bonn Agreement." Security Council Resolution 1510, October 13, 2003.

³⁶ 'Final Communiqué', Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Jun. 3, 2003, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_20291.htm.

³⁷ Lisbon Summit Declaration, Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Lisbon on November 20, 2010, Press Release, PR/CP(2010)0155, November 20, 2010, Para. 4.

³⁸ Security Council Resolution (1386) December 20, 2001; Daniele Riggio, 'NATO Support to the Afghan stabilization Process: An Evolving Mission for a Long-Term Commitment', in Oktay F. Tanrisever, (ed.) *Afghanistan and Central Asia: NATO's Role in Regional Security Since 9/11* (Amsterdam: IOS Press, 2013), pp. 20-21.

³⁹ See for example, Council of the European Union, *A Secure Europe in a Better World. European Security Strategy*, Brussels, Council of the European Union, 12 December 2003; United Nations, *High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change. A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility*, Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change, (United Nations Publications, 2004); Michael J. Williams, 'Empire Lite Revisited: NATO, the Comprehensive Approach and State-building in Afghanistan', *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 18, No. 1 (2011), pp. 64-78.

⁴⁰ Astri Suhrke, 'A Contradictory Mission? NATO from Stabilization to Combat in Afghanistan', *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 15, No. 2 (2008), p. 230.

Force. This section briefly reviews the Chicago Summit, during which the concept of Smart Defense developed. It also reviews the 2014 Wales Summit, which sought to guarantee that the Alliance continues to be at the forefront of promoting stability and security in an unstable world. Attention then shifts to the CDSP, which could challenge NATO's existence as it is ultimately a European, as opposed to a transatlantic security community.

The Chicago Summit: Attempting to Paper over the Cracks

In May 2012, the NATO member states met in Chicago for a summit. The summit was a reaction to global events: the 2007-2008 economic crisis, the drawing down in Afghanistan, which began in 2010 with the phased transition of security from ISAF to the Afghan National Security Forces, intervention fatigue, and other issues such as European integration with the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty. Chicago also sought to embrace the 2010 Group of Experts Report, which shed light on the new security environment: traditional threats (proliferation, WMD, militarization) and new, emerging transnational threats such as organized crime, human trafficking, arms, and drugs.⁴¹

Smart Defense, was NATO's response to the new security, political and economic environment, as Smart Defense emphasizes cooperation and collaboration, particularly between NATO and the European Union⁴² while also indicating a strategic cultural shift by that NATO's may lack the ability to project hard power. The subtext of Smart Defense is that by not meeting the Prague Summit defense spending commitment of 2% of each country's gross domestic, NATO and specifically the European members were weakening the alliance. These considerations may explain why the summit recognized that NATO has to cooperate and collaborate with others. Thus, Smart Defense has a strong European focus in that it aims to keep the European states committed to the NATO defense goals by seeking spending at a time when the Europeans are cutting down on spending. It has three key elements: prioritization, referring to the need to align national capability priorities with NATO's capability goals; cooperation in terms of pooling military capabilities with the members to enjoy economies of scale and improve inter-operability; and, specialization, calling on member states to invest in areas that they excel in and relinquish capability in others.⁴³ Simply, Smart Defense refers to "how NATO can help nations to build greater security with fewer resources but more coordination and coherence, so that together we can avoid the financial crisis from becoming a security crisis."⁴⁴ Additionally, Smart Defense is also an

⁴¹ The experts declared "Between now and 2020, it will be tested by the emergence of new dangers, the many-sided demands of complex operations, and the challenge of organizing itself efficiently in an era where rapid responses are vital, versatility critical, and resources tight." They added, "NATO needs a new Strategic Concept because the world has changed significantly since 1999, when the current concept was adopted." *NATO 2020: Assured Security; Dynamic Engagement: Analysis and Recommendation of the Group of Experts on a New Strategic Concept for NATO*, Group of Expert Report, May 17, 2010. <http://www.nato.int/strategic-concept/expertsreport.pdf>

⁴² *Summit Declaration on Defence Capabilities: Toward NATO Forces 2020*, NATO Official Text, May 20, 2012. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_87594.htm

⁴³ Bastian Giegerich, 'NATO's Smart Defence: Who's Buying?', *Survival*, Vol. 54, No. 3 (2012), pp. 69-70.

⁴⁴ "Building security in an age of austerity", Keynote speech by NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen at the 2011 Munich Security Conference, Feb. 5, 2011, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_70400.htm.

attempt to address the defense budget spending imbalance, which irks the United States, which often claims that it carries the heavier burden.⁴⁵

At Chicago, NATO addressed the challenge of countering terrorism by recognizing that the alliance must remain vested in this issue because the terrorism threat to the Euro-Atlantic Zone and international relations remains potent. The question however was on the methods, as “hard power” ceased to be an option. In adopting a new policy guideline, NATO’s focus when it came to counterterrorism was with awareness, capabilities, and engagement,⁴⁶ expounded upon in the 2012 Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism (PAP-T). By adopting the PAP-T, NATO not only underlined the centrality of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) Program,⁴⁷ but it committed itself to improve intelligence sharing and cooperation, developing defense capabilities against terrorist attack and the means to address the consequences of terrorist attack.⁴⁸

NATO adopted took this approach probably because it had to be mindful of European national civilian and judicial authorities, who in 2012 were more willing to question, challenge, and reject state policies in relation to terrorism.⁴⁹ Thus, under the first pillar, awareness, NATO emphasized its ability to foster resilience, mainly by highlighting the threat that transnational terrorism poses (as a defensive, military organization, NATO’s warnings arguably carry more weight than if they came from a non-military, security actor). In terms of capabilities, NATO stressed the experience it had acquired in addressing asymmetric threats, specifically in air defense, CBRN and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, airspace security, maritime security, and protection of critical infrastructure. On the issue of engagement, NATO proposed a holistic approach, which resonated with a human security paradigm. Drawing on the framework established in the Comprehensive Approach Action Plan – linking development with security – NATO made a commitment to reach out to international partners such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the UN, the EU, and

⁴⁵ In his Munich Speech, Secretary-General Rasmussen not only noted that defense spending by NATO’s European member nations declined by approximately 45 billion, while China has tripled its defense expenditure over the past decade while the Indian defense budget rose BY almost 60 per cent in the same period. Thus, for Rasmussen Smart Defense would prevent a division within Europe over security responsibility and a weak Europe, as without a commitment to defense spending, the Europeans would be unable to meet the challenge of global security, leading the Americans “look elsewhere for reliable defence partners.” “Building security in an age of austerity”, Keynote speech by NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen at the 2011 Munich Security Conference, Feb. 5, 2011, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_70400.htm.

⁴⁶ *Nato’s Policy Guidelines On Counter-Terrorism*, NATO Official Text, May 21, 2012. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_87905.htm?

⁴⁷ Established in 1994, PfP and currently involving 22 countries, the program aims to facilitate better relations between NATO and individual Euro-Atlantic states. PfP programs cover such things as civil-military relations, education and training, military-to-military cooperation including exercises, civil emergency planning and disaster response, cooperation on science and environmental issues, defense policy and planning, defense reform. *The Partnership for Peace programme*, NATO Official Text, Mar 31, 2014. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-61AC6056-DCB4420E/natolive/topics_50349.htm

⁴⁸ *The Partnership Action plan Against Terrorism*, NATO Official Text, Mar 5, 2012. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_50084.htm

⁴⁹ Adam Tomkins, ‘Criminalizing Support for Terrorism: A Comparative Perspective’, *Duke Journal of Constitutional Law & Public Policy*, Vol. 6, (2011), pp. 81-97; Juan Santos Vara, ‘The Consequences of Kadi: Where the Divergence of Opinion between EU and International Lawyers Lies?’, *European Law Journal*, Vol. 17, No. 2 (2011), pp. 252-274.

civilian bodies to aid in crisis management by making references to shared responsibilities, openness, and individual strengths. Under this pillar, NATO underlined its value – experience – in aiding actors engaged in non-traditional responses – institution building, development, governance, and rule of law – to security threats.⁵⁰

In sum, Chicago attempted to raise the need for the alliance's to formulate a more holistic, non-traditional security outlook to counter terrorism, as the member states are unlikely to engage in an Afghanistan-type mission in the near future, if ever at all. The major issue however was the economic pressures that were impacting national defense budgets, which led Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen to advocate for Smart Defense, as a way to cement the alliance as divisions over cost allocation were clearly cause concern, as well as emphasis that it could ensure that the alliance remains relevant in international affairs and retain its responsibilities for international security.

The Wales Summit: Seeking Stability in an Unstable World

Two years after the Chicago Summit, the NATO Heads of State and Government met at Newport, Wales for a two-days summit aimed at addressing “a pivotal moment in Euro-Atlantic security.”⁵¹ The initial focus was going to be with cyber- and ballistic-missile threats, the reinvigoration of NATO's maritime posture and general readiness.⁵² However, events changed the focus as noted by NATO Secretary General Rasmussen who declared in his Doorstep Statement, “To the East, Russia is attacking Ukraine. To the Southeast, we see the rise of a terrorist organization, the so-called Islamic State, that has committed horrific atrocities. To the South, we see violence, insecurity, instability.”⁵³

The Summit's declaration captured five, interconnected, issues that would seemingly govern the alliance as it moves forward.⁵⁴ In focusing on the crisis in the Ukraine, the alliance not only issued the Joint Statement of the NATO-Ukraine Commission but it made the Wales Pledge: a set of comprehensive and specific measures that NATO would make to the Ukraine in respect to the rehabilitation for injured troops, cyber defense, logistics, and command and control and communications.⁵⁵ The issue however was also about expressing concern with Russia and some of President Putin's policies and general attitudes towards international peace

⁵⁰ A “Comprehensive Approach” to Crisis Management, NATO, October 3, 2013. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_51633.htm

⁵¹ NATO, ‘Wales Summit Declaration’, Sept. 4-5, 2014. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/351406/Wales_Summit_Declaration.pdf.

⁵² James Bergeron, ‘Back to the Future in Wales’, *The RUSI Journal*, Vol. 159, No. 3 (2014), pp. 4-8.

⁵³ Anders Fogh Rasmussen, ‘Doorstep statement’, Sept. 4, 2014. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_112479.htm.

⁵⁴ NATO, ‘Wales Summit Declaration’, Sept. 4-5, 2014. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/351406/Wales_Summit_Declaration.pdf.

⁵⁵ NATO, ‘NATO leaders pledge support to Ukraine at Wales Summit’, NATO Press, Sept. 04, 2014, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_112459.htm.

and security. Thus, the allies emphasized that that Russia was breaching international law, causing regional insecurity that was impacting neighboring states and essentially not behaving as a trustful, reliable ally.⁵⁶ Nonetheless, there is also an element of pragmatism in the declaration as the allies recognize their limitations in terms of offering a robust – military – response. Therefore, the focus is very much on finding peaceful solutions, mainly through negotiations and sanctions, including a commitment not to recognize the annexation of the Crimea. Interspersed with the imploding crisis in the Ukraine, was the allies' commitment to address defense spending, specifically the disparity in contributions. At Wales however it was not so much about the amount, but the quality, which led to a focus on the need for greater multilateralism and specialization, specifically in reference to defense industrial cooperation, leading the alliance to declare, "NATO and EU efforts to strengthen defense capabilities are complementary."⁵⁷ The third issue was the need to reform the alliance by not only improving its own readiness to take quick military action, but support to its allies, new and old one. The focus on partnership was a continuation on the Chicago Summit, when the allies recognized it had a readiness problem, leading to the adoption of the Readiness Action Plan (RAP), which involves the setting up of 'spearhead unit' (or 'very high-readiness joint task force') of 4,000 troops within the NATO Response Force, which NATO emphasizes are not combat forces, as such a thing would be a breach of NATO's commitment to Russia not to station combat troops in central and eastern Europe. The new force was to be deployable at short notice (within 48 hours).⁵⁸ At Wales, however, the allies expanded its commitment to partnership within and beyond the Euro-Atlantic zone.⁵⁹ Thus, for example NATO reached out to the Gulf Cooperation Council, which includes encouraging the Gulf states to participate in NATO's *Ocean Shield* operation and interoperability, with NATO taking the view that the role played by the United Arab Emirates and Qatar in aerial operations during the Libya intervention underline mutual interests and that NATO can work with Gulf states in promoting security.⁶⁰

The two final issues that were to occupy the summit were not new ones, as the alliance had to deal with Afghanistan and Islamist extremism. On Afghanistan, the heads of state and government emphasized the

⁵⁶ It is notably that Jens Stoltenberg in his first speech as Secretary-General, which he gave at the German Marshall Fund declared, "To the east, Russia's actions in Ukraine are in breach of international law. They have severely damaged trust. And they pose a major challenge to Euro-Atlantic security." 'NATO: A Unique Alliance with a Clear Course', Speech by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg at the German Marshall Fund, Brussels, Oct. 29, 2014, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_114179.htm.

⁵⁷ NATO, 'Wales Summit Declaration', Sept. 4-5, 2014, Para 14. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/351406/Wales_Summit_Declaration.pdf.

⁵⁸ Richard Norton-Taylor, 'Nato barked, but will that help Ukraine, and help deter Putin?', *Guardian*, Sept. 7, 2014. <http://www.theguardian.com/world/defence-and-security-blog/2014/sep/07/nato-ukraine-putin>.

⁵⁹ 'NAPCI: Solving the Asian Paradox', Remarks by NATO Deputy Secretary General Alexander Vershbow at the Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Initiative Forum, Seoul, Republic of Korea, Oct. 28, 2014, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_114190.htm.

⁶⁰ 'Strengthening NATO-Gulf cooperation', Intervention by NATO Deputy Secretary General Alexander Vershbow at the Abu Dhabi Strategic Debate, Emirates Palace, Abu Dhabi, Oct. 20, 2014, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_113987.htm.

important role the alliance played in promoting peace, security and stability, while also recognizing that there is much that there is more to do, specifically in Resolute Support Mission, whereby NATO allies and partner nations provide not only financial support but continued training, advising and assisting to the Afghan security force after 2014.⁶¹ The final issue was the Islamist extremism, with the leaders first noting the general danger that Islamist extremist pose to international and regional security, before linking it to the threat from the ISIL, leading NATO to declare that ISIS “poses a grave threat to the Iraqi people, to the Syrian people, to the wider region, and to our nations.”⁶² NATO’s response to ISIL was multifaceted military engagement, but also supporting others to engage with ISIL so as to first contain it and then destroy it.⁶³

In sum, the Wales Declaration, which was one of the longest in NATO’s history, identifies many issues that could potentially threaten the alliance, its allies and international security. These new and old threats demand two things: readiness and strength, which is why the NATO members have to engage in a cost-conscious defense spending based on burden sharing and multilateralism.

Common Defense and Security Policy

An important element in the European project is its security and defense identity, a controversial and challenging pillar, as states are loath to cede security and defense powers. This may explain why the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and CSDP strive to balance national, transnational, and supranational interests, necessitates the development of frameworks and mechanisms to enhance the national, transnational, and supranational security and defense cooperation. The process towards a common defense and security gathered momentum in the 1990s. The Maastricht Treaty was a first step toward a framework for a European security identity that highlighted five key objectives: safeguard common values and fundamental interests; strengthen the security of the Union; preserve peace and strengthen international security; promote international cooperation; and develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law.⁶⁴ In 1997, the Amsterdam Treaty introduced the Common Strategy concept and a year later at the Anglo-French Summit (St. Malo) the EU adopted a policy of addressing humanitarian crises and/or rescue missions through police support, legal discourse, disaster relief, meditation, development, peacekeeping, and crisis management. By

⁶¹ NATO, ‘Wales Summit Declaration on Afghanistan’, Sept. 4, 2014, <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/wales-summit-declaration-on-afghanistan/wales-summit-declaration-on-afghanistan>.

⁶² NATO, ‘Wales Summit Declaration’, Sept. 4-5, 2014, Para 33. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/351406/Wales_Summit_Declaration.pdf.

⁶³ David Cameron and Barack Obama, ‘We will not be cowed by barbaric killers: As Islamic extremists commit despicable murder and Russia holds a gun to Ukraine, Nato must strengthen its alliance’, *The Times*, Sep. 4, 2014, p. 31.

⁶⁴ These are very similar to what NATO is engaging in, which is why there are numerous attempts to get the two to cooperate. Steven Blockmans, ‘The Influence of NATO on the Development of the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy,’ in Ramses A. Wessel and Steven Blockmans (ed.) *Between Autonomy and Dependence: The EU Legal Order under the Influence of International Organisations* (The Hague: Asser Press, 2013), pp. 243-267.

taking a multilevel approach, the EU forges or at least strives toward a common security identity that represents values such as democracy, freedom, human rights, accountability, and multilateralism.

By adopting the European Security Strategy (ESS) in 2003, expanded in 2008 with the ESS Review,⁶⁵ the EU crystallized its view of security, taking the view that the root causes of insecurity is instability, which needs to be addressed through development, human rights, and good governance.⁶⁶ The emphasis on good governance is in reference to good democratic governance (social and political equality and representation, human rights protection, rule of law, and positive trade and development policies).⁶⁷ These are after all values that the EU aspires to and identifies itself as embodying. The 2008 ESS Review added cyber security, climate change, and pandemics as issues that the EU should pay attention to, within the ambit of building human security.⁶⁸ For ESS to work, the EU called for multilateralism because the issues are complex and cumbersome, needing the pooling and sharing of resources.⁶⁹ Accomplishing the ESS objectives has become easier with the creation of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy for the European Union and the founding of the EU's External Action Service (EAS), which is tasked with pursuing bilateral relations, both of which are products of the Lisbon Treaty. In other words, what was created at Lisbon was a mechanism for the EU to be proactive by not only calling for action but taking action, whether by addressing earthquake relief in Haiti or in responding to sectarian killing in the Central African Republic.

Lisbon has empowered the EU, enabling it to engage in over twenty humanitarian interventions, some of which are not authorized by Security Council, which further reinforces its desire to serve as an independent actor, in addition to participating and leading complex negotiations such as Iran's uranium-enrichment program and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The appointment of Federica Mogherini, as Catherine Ashton's successor, seems to suggest that the EU recognizes that its two key challenges for the immediate period is Islamist

⁶⁵ Sven Biscop, 'Peace without Money, War without Americans: Challenges for European Strategy', *International Affairs*, Vol. 89, No. 5 (2013), pp. 1126-1127.

⁶⁶ In 2004, a study group led by Professor Mary Kaldor proposed *A Human Security Doctrine for Europe*, with the core recommendation being that in order to implement the 2003 European Security Strategy, Europe needed a military force that embraced the human security agenda. In 2007, the Madrid Report emerged which floated the idea that the European way of security adopt human security as its operating framework. *A Human Security for Europe*, The Barcelona Report of the Study Group on Europe's Security Capabilities, Barcelona, September 15, 2004. <http://www.lse.ac.uk/internationalDevelopment/research/CSHS/humanSecurity/barcelonaReport.pdf>; *A European Way of Security*, The Madrid Report of the Human Security Study Group comprising a Proposal and Background Report, Madrid, November 8, 2007. http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/40207/1/A_European_Way_of_Security%28author%29.pdf; Nicoletta Pirozzi, 'The EU's Comprehensive Approach to Crisis Management', *Geneva Center for Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF)*, June 2013.

⁶⁷ European Council, *European Security Strategy: A Secure Europe in a Better World* (Brussels, December 12, 2003), p. 10. <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf>

⁶⁸ European Union *Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy – Providing Security in a Changing World* (Brussels: 2008) www.consilium.europa.eu/showpage.aspx?id=266&lang=EN.

⁶⁹ Sven Biscop, 'Peace without Money, War without Americans: Challenges for European Strategy', *International Affairs*, Vol. 89, No. 5 (2013), p. 1127; *Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy – Providing Security in a Changing World*, European Union (Brussels: 2008) www.consilium.europa.eu/showpage.aspx?id=266&lang=EN.

extremism and Russia.⁷⁰ Thus, in the post-Lisbon Treaty period, the EU is well on its way to becoming a global security actor, as many of the structural and bureaucratic barriers that previously inhibited its ability to do so were removed,⁷¹ with the High Representative taking the position that Lisbon has remedied the gap between supply and demand of security.⁷²

NATO as a Maritime Force: Providing Human Security

NATO has two major maritime operations, *Active Endeavour* and *Ocean Shield*, which represent one way for NATO to remain relevant in international relations and global security. The two operations are closely linked to the way naval policy is evolving in the twenty-first century as established and emerging naval powers strive to assert their position under the sun.⁷³ Threats from terrorists and pirates have become effective excuses for states and regional actors to announce their naval concerns and commitments as well as seek out allies.⁷⁴ This approach is seen most clearly in counter-piracy operations off the Somali coast where the EU (Operation *Atalanta*), NATO (Operation *Ocean Shield*), and various national navies such as Indian and Chinese operate, imposing greater interaction between the various actors.⁷⁵

Operation *Active Endeavour* began in 2001 as a reaction to 9/11.⁷⁶ Designed as a counter-terrorism operation with a specific geographical focus (Eastern Mediterranean), it not only seeks to deter and disrupt terrorist activity throughout the Mediterranean but it also provides rescue operations, addresses criminal activities, and adds another dimension to the Mediterranean Dialogue, which includes Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan,

⁷⁰ Mogherini graduated from La Sapienza University in political science, writing her thesis on Political Islam, while as a member of the Italian social democratic party she is familiar with many communists, leading some to suggest that she is pro-Russian. Ian Taylor, 'EU power struggle over foreign policy chief role ends in deadlock', *The Guardian*, Jul. 17, 2014, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jul/17/eu-summit-power-struggle-foreign-policy-chief-role-deadlock>; Lizzy Davis, 'A portrait of Federica Mogherini, the EU's next foreign policy chief', *The Guardian*, Aug. 30, 2014, <http://www.theguardian.com/global/2014/aug/30/portrait-federica-mogherini-eu-foreign-policy-chief>.

⁷¹ David Allen and Michael Smith, 'Relations with the Rest of the World', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 49, No. 1 (2011), pp. 209-30.

⁷² Catherine Ashton, 'The European Union's Role in Global Affairs', *Hampton Roads International Security Quarterly*, April 1 2010, p. 2629.

⁷³ Ivan T. Luke, 'Naval Operations in Peacetime', *Naval War College Review*, Vol. 66, No. 2 (2013), pp. 10-26; Alexandr Burilkov and Torsten Geise, 'Maritime Strategies of Rising Powers: developments in China and Russia', *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 34, No. 6, (2013), pp. 1037-53.

⁷⁴ In the Introduction to *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower*, it is declared, "The security, prosperity, and vital interests of the United States are increasingly coupled to those of other nations. Our Nation's interests are best served by fostering a peaceful global system comprised of interdependent networks of trade, finance, information, law, people and governance." The aim of the Strategy is to advocate for greater naval cooperation as a way to promote U.S. national security and international peace and security. *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower*, U.S. Navy, October 21, 2007, <http://www.navy.mil/maritime/maritimestrategy.pdf>

⁷⁵ Lee Willett, 'Pirates and Power Politics: Naval Presence and Grand Strategy in the Horn of Africa', *The RUSI Journal*, Vol. 156, No. 6 (2012), pp. 20-25.

⁷⁶ In February and again in August 2001, Italian authorities boarded two Tonga-flagged vessels and found Al Qaeda operatives. In May and June 2002, Moroccan authorities captured three Saudi nationals, including Abdul Rahim Abda al-Nasheri, bin Laden's chief of maritime operations, as they were plotting suicide attacks against American and British warships in the Straits of Gibraltar. Alan Lee Boyer, 'Naval Response to a Changed Security Environment', *Naval War College Review*, Vol. 60, No. 3 (2007), pp. 77-78.

Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia – through coordination and cooperation mechanisms.⁷⁷ The Dialogue has two key dimensions: political and practical. On the political sides, the Dialogue establishes mechanism, regular ambassadorial-level meeting and working groups on a host of issues relevant to the security of the Mediterranean to ensure cooperative security. The practical aspect of the program involves workshops and other practical activities in the fields of modernization, civil emergency planning, crisis management, border security, small arms & light weapons, and scientific and environmental cooperation. Additionally, a strong focus is placed on how to address terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Thus, the operation has evolved from a traditional security operations, to a mechanism that provides protection and as a tool to improve relations between the NATO members and the other countries, emphasizing once again, NATO's commitment to develop and build partnerships.

NATO's other key maritime operation is *Ocean Shield*, which evolved out of Operation *Pearl*: a NATO naval outreach operation designed to not only promote naval security but also forge ties with out-of-area states such as New Zealand, Australia, and Japan.⁷⁸ Operation *Ocean Shield*, whose purpose is to deter and disrupt piracy in the Gulf of Eden, was deployed in 2008 in response to the threats posed by Somali pirates to humanitarian aid,⁷⁹ international peace and security,⁸⁰ and the global economy.⁸¹ Through this operation, NATO provides naval escort to vessels that seek it as they navigate the Gulf of Eden and the Horn of Africa. A key aim of the operation, beyond providing basic maritime security from pirates, is capacity building, which lies at the heart of the Alliance Maritime Strategy and Maritime Security Operations: cooperative security, deterrence, and crisis management.⁸² To that end, the force has engaged public health education that includes education in Solar Water Disinfection (SODIS).⁸³ As part of the capacity building program, NATO has including a Ukrainian and

⁷⁷ For a good review of the Security challenge posed by the Mediterranean region see, Alan Lee Boyer, 'Naval Response to a Changed Security Environment', *Naval War College Review*, Vol. 60, No. 3 (2007), pp. 73-100.

⁷⁸ Operation *Pearl* was a 117-day deployment involving Portuguese, Canadian, Spanish, German, American, French, and Belgian vessels that travelled from Europe to South-east Asia, ending up in Australia. 'Operation Pearl, 2009: Global Outreach', *Standing NATO Maritime Group 1*, 2009. http://www.manw.nato.int/pdf/global_reach_booklet.pdf

⁷⁹ On October 9, 2008, the NATO defense ministers followed a request from the UN Secretary-General agreed to dispatch seven ships to provide escort to World Food Program vessels operating around the Somali coastline. *Operation Allied Provider*, NATO Allied Command Operation, <http://www.aco.nato.int/page13984631.aspx>.

⁸⁰ Security Council Resolution 1844 (2008), November 20, 2008; Security Council Resolution 1846 (2008), December 2, 2008; Security Council Resolution 1851 (2008), December 16, 2008.

⁸¹ In 2010, Somali pirates ceased over 1100 people, of whom half were released once a ransom was paid, explaining why ransoms in 2010 amount to \$238 million, an average of \$5.4 million per ship, compared to \$150,000 in 2005. 'Somali Piracy: At sea', *The Economist*, February, 5-11 2011, p. 16

⁸² *Alliance Maritime Strategy*, NATO Official Text, March 18, 2011, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_75615.htm

⁸³ This is a low cost-method involving the filling of clear plastic bottle with water that may contain diarrhea-causing microbes. The bottle is exposed to direct sunlight (UV-light) for six hours, leading to purified, drinkable water. 'NATO counter-piracy force conducts public health education off the coast of Somalia', NATO Ocean Shield, Oct. 24, 2014. <http://www.mc.nato.int/PressReleases/Pages/NATO-counter-piracy-force-conducts-public-health-education-off-the-coast-of-Somalia.aspx>.

a New Zealand naval forces⁸⁴ as part of *Ocean Shield* as well as conducting a joint counter-piracy with a Japanese destroyer to refine communication, tactical movements and procedures.⁸⁵

Conclusion

The post-9/11 period has challenged NATO's approach to security. While on the one hand, the alliance has to ensure the security of its members, on the other hand, it has to face pressures from domestic, regional, and international politics. Undoubtedly, NATO has in its sixty years successfully reinvented its security identity, ensuring its continued relevance and use in global affairs and its status as the preeminent military alliance. Nevertheless, the alliance increasingly has to contend with changes in the world and a changing security environment that cast doubts on its relevance.

Clearly, CDSP is NATO's most formidable adversary. European integration necessitates an enhanced single European defense and security identity, which is why even though French and British officials dismissed rumors about the possibility of the two countries sharing an aircraft carrier, budgetary concerns and the existence of a EU framework for specialization would naturally lead to defense harmonization and synchronization.⁸⁶ Moreover, the EU through the ESS and ESS Review is institutionalizing a human security agenda by focusing on non-traditional security concerns, which are by definition transnational in orientation, and is forging closer ties between the EU members, which NATO cannot compete with. This supra-national inter-governmentalism agenda⁸⁷ fits with the Union development-security nexus: attaining security necessitates engaging in development work,⁸⁸ while at the same time creates stronger bonds between the members. The EU's *Atalanta* Operation is a case in point. Although a voluntary operation in terms of contributions, it has led to the creation of the Maritime Security Centre Horn of Africa (MSCHOA), a web-based platform where ship-owners update their position and register their vessels securely. By having secure chat-rooms that allow for interaction between various parties, the EU is asserting its security identity.⁸⁹ The EU's security agenda benefits

⁸⁴ The presence of the two non-NATO forces, were also the only time that there was no U.S. naval component to *Ocean Shield*. 'Ukraine contributes to NATO's Ocean Shield', Oct. 11, 2013, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_103997.htm; 'New Zealand joins NATO's counter-piracy mission Ocean Shield', Jan. 21, 2014. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_106317.htm.

⁸⁵ 'NATO and Japan Counter-Piracy Forces conduct combined exercise in Gulf of Aden', Allied Maritime Command HQ MARCOM, Press Release Sept. 26 2014, Ref: OOS 2014 05, http://www.mc.nato.int/PressReleases/News%20Release%20Documents/040926_MARCOM_NR_2014_05_NATO%20and%20Japan%20counter-piracy%20forces%20conduct%20combined%20exercise_PAO_NU.pdf

⁸⁶ Richard Norton-Taylor, 'Britain and France will not share aircraft carriers, official say', *The Guardian*, September 2, 2010. <http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2010/sep/02/britain-france-will-not-share-aircraft-carriers>

⁸⁷ Jolyon Howorth, 'European Integration and Defence: The Ultimate Challenge?', *Chaillot Paper* No. 43, (Paris: WEU-ISS, 2000). <http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/cp043e.pdf>; Jolyon Howorth, 'Decision-making in Security and Defense policy: Towards Supranational Inter-governmentalism?', *Cooperation and Conflict*, Vol. 47, No. 4 (2012), pp. 433-53.

⁸⁸ The European Consensus on Development states that Combating global poverty "will also help to build a more stable, peaceful, prosperous and equitable world," *The European Consensus on Development*, European Council (2006), (2006/C 46/01). <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2006:046:0001:0019:EN:PDF>

⁸⁹ Kamil Zwolski, 'The EU as An International Security Actor after Lisbon: Finally A Green Light for A Holistic Approach?', *Cooperation and Conflict*, Vol. 47, No. 1 (2012), p. 77.

from its ability to provide economic and political assistance through existing frameworks and EU technocrats, which empowers the union at the expense of the alliance.

NATO has shown incredible skills at adapting to changing world events and there is nothing to suggest that the alliance cannot once again reinvent itself. In taking a more human security agenda and due to the imprecision associated with the term, NATO can and should understand it as a concept rather than a manual. Such an interpretation serves NATO well, permitting the alliance to its own view of human security. Accordingly, NATO's interaction with human security discourse could manifest itself along two lines. First, focusing on human security allows NATO to expand its scope of functions to include climate change and natural disasters,⁹⁰ cybercrime,⁹¹ humanitarian crises and population movements including refugees,⁹² and many more emerging security threats. Second, in engaging in crisis management, a core task of the Alliance, which also calls for a military and non-military response, NATO can elevate individual suffering and address human insecurities.⁹³ By focusing on crisis management NATO can contain or reduce the crisis, and in doing so, it prevents large population movements, displacement, and insecurity which tend to directly impact the member states. However, an essential aspect is recognizing the need for a crisis management approach. In sum, the human security discourse permits NATO to draw on its goal of promoting neoliberal economic values, democracy, and freedom as a way to promote the security of its citizens. Nevertheless, to be successful in first transforming itself and second to remain useful and engaged in world affairs, NATO must address the presence of a CDSP, growing transatlantic discord, and most importantly the indifferent manner in which its members treat it.

⁹⁰ See for example NATO's Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC) and its Partnership for Peace Trust Fund Initiative both of which are designed to address environmental crises, leading NATO to join in 2004, the Environment and Security (ENVSEC) Initiative with the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) and the Regional Environment Center for Central and Eastern Europe (REC).

⁹¹ In 2008, NATO established the Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCD CoE) in Tallinn to provide research and training on cyber defence, specifically, enhance capability, cooperation and information sharing among NATO, NATO nations and partners. Four years later, NATO adopted the NATO Defence Planning Process aimed at providing a framework to harmonize national and Alliance defense planning activities in the realm of cyber.

⁹² During the October 2005 earthquake in Pakistan, NATO worked with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to provide humanitarian aid and relief. NATO delivered over 3,000 tons of relief, its field hospitals treated almost 4000 people whereas its mobile units treated over 3000 people; its engineers repaired roads, removed debris and provided clean water.

⁹³ 'Crisis Management', North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Nov. 16, 2011. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49192.htm?